# 1NC

## 1

#### A. Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ‘03

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Decisionmaking—debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and **implement an alternative politics.** The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a **substantive policy discussion.** Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an **institutional lever** with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list.

These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political **system as a whole**, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to **participate directly in politics themselves**; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48

Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy.

Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan itself**, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection.

III. Conclusion

The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the **objections against particular projects** was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general.

One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic.

Parliamentary Politics

In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to **formulate an alternative politics**, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry.

Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program.

This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. **On the other hand**, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The **lively debate** stimulated by grassroots groups and parties **keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.**

Technical Debate

In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate.** They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators.

The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to **challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making**. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria.

Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic.

In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56

In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the **contribution of grassroots** environmental **groups has been significant.** As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues **has been tremendous**.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 **Policy concessions** and new legal provisions for citizen participation **have not quelled grassroots action.** The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### And, Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

#### Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

#### Unconditional environmental justice destroys policy priorities, tanking any risk analysis because they try to INCLUDE all viewpoints WITHOUT LIMITS

Foreman 98

Christopher Foreman is a nonresident senior fellow in Governance Studies. Since 2000, he has also been a professor and director of the social policy program at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy. His research focuses on the politics of health, race, environmental regulation, government reform, and domestic social policy

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Conceptual Drawbacks of Environmental Justice From a rationalizing perspective, a major problem with the environmental justice version of the democratizing critique is that, like ecopopulism more generally, it threatens to worsen the problem of environmental policy's missing priorities. As Walter Rosenbaum elaborates: like the man who mounted his horse and galloped off in all directions, the EPA has no constant course. With responsibility for administering nine separate statutes and parts of four others, the EPA has no clearly mandated priorities, no way of allocating scarce resources among different statutes or among programs within a single law. Nor does the EPA have a congressional charter, common to most federal departments and agencies, defining its broad organizational mission and priorities.... Congress has shown little inclination to provide the EPA with a charter or mandated priorities, in good part because the debate sure to arise on the relative merit and urgency of different environmental problems is an invitation to a political bloodletting most legislators would gladly avoid. Intense controversy would be likely among states, partisans of different ecological issues, and regulated interests over which problems to emphasize; the resulting political brawl would upset existing policy coalitions that themselves were fashioned with great difficulty. Moreover, setting priorities invites a prolonged, bitter debate over an intensely emotional issue: should the primary objective of environmental protection be to reduce public risks associated with environmental degradation as much as seems practical or—as many environmentalists fervently believe—is the goal to eliminate all significant forms of pollution altogether?18 Environmental justice inevitably enlarges this challenge of missing priorities, and for similar reasons. As noted earlier, the movement is a delicate coalition of local and ethnic concerns unable to narrow its grievances for fear of a similar "political bloodletting."1? Overt de-emphasis or removal of any issue or claim would prompt the affected coalition members (for example, groups, communities, or tribes) to disrupt or depart it. And chances are they would not leave quietly but with evident resentment and perhaps accusatory rhetoric directed at the persons and organizations remaining. Real priority-setting runs contrary to radical egalitarian value premises, and no one (perhaps least of all a strong democratizer) wants to be deemed a victimizer. Therefore movement rhetoric argues that no community should be harmed and that all community concerns and grievances deserve redress. Scholar-activist Robert Bullard proposes that "the solution to unequal protection lies in the realm of environmental justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become a 'sacrifice zone."20 When pressed about the need for environmental risk priorities, and about how to incorporate environmental justice into priority setting, Bullard's answer is a vague plea for nondiscrimination, along with a barely more specific call for a "federal 'fair environmental protection act™ that would transform "protection from a privilege to a right."21 Bullard's position is fanciful and self-contradictory, but extremely telling. He argues essentially that the way to establish environmental priorities is precisely by guaranteeing that such priorities are impossible to implement. This is symptomatic of a movement for which untrammeled citizen voice and overall social equity are cardinal values. Bullard's position also epitomizes the desire of movement intellectuals to avoid speaking difficult truths (at least in public) to their allies and constituents. Ironically, in matters of health and risk, environmental justice poses a potentially serious, if generally unrecognized, danger to the minority and low-income communities it aspires to help. By discouraging citizens from thinking in terms of health and risk priorities (that is, by taking the position, in effect, that every chemical or site against which community outrage can be generated is equally hazardous), environmental justice can deflect attention from serious hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones.

Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency

Eijkman 12

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below

## 2

#### Energy metaphors look like science but aren’t – they’re the ILLUSION of explanation

Zepf 10

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International Forum of Psychoanalysis. 2010; 19: 314

Without knowing exactly what the metaphor1 of Freud’s cathectic-theoretical statements stands for so that ‘‘in consequence admitted metaphors such as ‘energy’ . . . have no specific content and can be filled to suit one’s fancy’’ (Nagel, 1959, p. 41) his formulations present unresolved riddles. Unresolved riddles do not solve problems, but as Kubie (1947), S. 511) states, the metaphor of ‘‘quantitative variations gives us a feeling of scientific maturity.’’ This feeling, however, is ‘‘in fact . . . premature and illusory’’ (1947, S. 511) because the ‘‘energy-distribution model,’’ as Habermas (1968/ 1972, p. 253) correctly argues, ‘‘only creates the semblance that psychoanalytic statements are about measurable transformations of energy,’’ and that they ‘‘imply observability of the events they are about. But these events are never observed\*nor can they be observed.’’ Although economic-energetic statements cannot explain any of this, being metaphorical and tautological in nature, some authors are in favour of holding onto the energetic-economic model, their main arguments being as follows: . One day in the future, psychical energy will be measurable. . At some point in the future, the model will allow a connection with other sciences, especially neurophysiological science. . We are in need of this model to provide order and to systematise clinical data. . It is leading to new insights. The first two arguments are contradicted by the fact that energy distributions can never be measured by the language-bound psychoanalytic method, and that a metaphorical model never can substitute for a metatheory. It is only via such a metatheory that insights into the same object from different science disciplines could be adequately mediated. The reasoning in the third argument overlooks the fact that a metaphorical ordering and systematization of clinical data can only yield apparent knowledge of that data’s interrelations, and in reality this is as remote from their real interrelations as, for instance, the anger of gods is remote from the conditions of lightning in a thunderstorm. Therefore, metaphors cannot provide us with new insights and can only offer us other metaphors. Furthermore, if we content ourselves with these metaphors as explanations, we have not only satisfied ourselves with a false understanding, but also become blind to the real problems and the need for explanations that are more pertinent to the issues.

#### Misapplications of energy metaphors are the worst form of scientism

Clarke 1

Energy Forms:

Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics

Bruce Clarke is Professor of Literature and Science at Texas Tech University

Scientism has formerly been conceptualized according to what Bruno Latour calls the diffusion model of the sociological field. In this model, science is privileged over other discourses as a ground of epistemological origin and sealed off from the irrationality of the rest of culture. On the diffusion model, scienrism is an epiphenomenon of real science, the relatively irrational social excess of scientific production. The diffusion model enforces a regime of sociological separatism; it produces an erroneous "belief in the existence of a society separated from technoscience.\*\*1 This diffusionist model of scientism is itself a relic of the social sciences\* own scientists bid for intellectual authority, lain Cameron and David O. Edge's classic exposition of scientism operates within the diffusionist framework, in which all scientistic commerce is conceived as a one-way outflow from a privileged scientific source: "Scientism is present where people draw on widely shared images and notions about the scientific community and its beliefs and practices in order to add weight to arguments they are advancing, or to practices they are promoting. . . . Those who use scientistic language acknowledge and respect the authority of the scientific community, and wish to capitalize on that authority.... In so doing, they reinforce and consolidate that authority.\*\*2 From this perspective, the modern proliferation of physical, biological, and mathematical scicntisms is seen as a relatively vitiated part of the cultural interaction among well-demarcated disciplinary realms of science, technology, and society. Diffusionist scientisms are illegitimate offspring of science that cobble to a extrascientific object the cultural aura of science's own epistemological prestige, typically by an extension of scientific terminology, imagery, and/or methodology. This adaptation can be deliberate or unwitting, earnest or satirical. It can be more or less successful as an intellectual or a social gambit. But irrespective of its discursive success or failure, scientism on the diffusion model is a sloppy affair, the random "spillover" of science into society, an inappropriate and at worst abusive extension of scientific terms or practices. For instance, the pioneering sociologist Max Weber "criticized positivism and scientific naturalism, singling out the social energeticists—Ernest Solvay and Wilhclm Ostwald—for their 'umstiilpung,' or spillover, of the 'world picture' of scientific disciplines into the 'worldviews' of the social sciences, where they ought not have a place."5 On the diffusion model, such extensions of scientific concepts are illicit displacements of authority from science to nonscientific matters, a transfer, sometimes a plunder, of science's social prestige. Scientisms are aberrant discourses circulating through social channels free of scientific control yet demanding some level of literal credence for what are at best overworked figurative conceptions. These abuses bottom out in "pseudoscience"—bogus representations or active misuses of scientific ideas. In sum, as a repository for derivative and deformed conceptions scientism has typically been a term of bad intellectual repute.

#### Energy transfer into the social order was the height of scientific determinism

Clarke 1

Energy Forms:

Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics

Bruce Clarke is Professor of Literature and Science at Texas Tech University

. The mode! of energy presented by this vision of universal heat death is perhaps the supreme expression of the Victorian allegory of thermodynamics. The North British scientists of energy fashioned an influential discourse of thermodynamic scientism that infused physical concepts—energy, dissipation, and equilibration—with moral contents— life, sin, and death.20 Early moralizations of thermodynamics were also part of the nineteenthcentury vogue for global continuities—a conceptual conviction that greatly aided the formation of vigorous scientisms. The ontological gaps between physical and moral laws, material and cultural effects, were cither dismissed or finessed through crude or refined forms of dialectical resolution.21 Smith notes that for Maxwell and Thomson, "dissipation of energy . . . linked together the natural and moral orders."22 In 1868 their colleagues Balfour Stewart and Norman I.ockyer penned an article, "The Place of Life in a Universe of Energy," that offered a similar dose of energy theology, collapsing the physical and the social and placing cosmic as well as personal redemption in the hands of God: "As in the social world a man may degrade his energy, so in the physical world energy may be degraded; in both worlds, when degradation is once accomplished, a complete recovery would appear to be impossible, unless energy of a superior form be communicated from without."23

#### Mapping of energy metaphors onto the social body for the sake of PRODUCTION creates fascist forms of utopianism

Clarke 1

Energy Forms:

Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics

Bruce Clarke is Professor of Literature and Science at Texas Tech University

The physical and metaphysical ambiguities of "dissipation" could thus be mapped onto the theological dualism of matter and spirit. But for the secular humanist Spencer, civic institutions were fallen, and social evolutionism offered hope that they could be ameliorated by closer coordination with the progressive unfolding of natural processes. In this instance, however, the very systematic equivocations he used to eliminate the gap between nature and culture now tied his vision of evolving culture to the specter of a dying nature. Previously positing "equilibration" as the tclos of his evolutionary scheme, Spencer had allowed the concept to circulate at large from individual, to social, to physical and biological development. The notion of energy dissipation leading to thermodynamic equilibrium, even as mediated by the relatively secular Tyndall, now came to Spencer as an unwelcome admonishment, placing a chill on his rosy evolutionary scenario. Anson Rabinbach's The Human Motor provides a helpful breakdown of the interconnected modalities of thermodynamic scientisms as they proliferated in the decades following Thomson's and Spencer's generation. In its epistemological implications, late-classical thcrmodynamicism subscribed to "positivism—the cognitive monopoly and idealization of the scientific method along with the search for general laws of both nature and society."27 In its broadest cosmological formation as a theory of universal nature, thermodynamics gave rise to "modern productivism—the belief that human society and nature are linked by the primacy and identity of all productive activity. . . . The cosmos was essentially a system of production whose product was the universal Kraft necessary to power the engines of nature and society" (3). Thermodynamic scientisms also proliferated within social and political discourses: "The dynamic language of energy was . . . central to many Utopian social and political ideologies of the early twentieth century: Taylorism, bolshevism, and fascism" (2). And in its physiological adaptation, classical thermodynamics reconceived the organic body as a machine, a motor or heat engine: "For physiologists armed with the principles of thermodynamics, the energy of the body was not merely analogous to other natural physical forces, it became one among them" (46).

#### Scientism enables Nazism, ecocide and posthuman disaster – unchecked devotion to so-called objective rationality allows us to exterminate whole groups in the name of progress

Yates 10

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<http://vmyates.posterous.com/when-science-became-doctrine>

cites TODOROV Tzvetan Todorov (Bulgarian: Цветан Тодоров) (born March 1, 1939 in Sofia) is a Franco-Bulgarian philosopher. He has lived in France since 1963 writing books and essays about literary theory, thought history and culture theory. Todorov has published a total of 21 books, including The Poetics of Prose (1971), Introduction to Poetics (1981), The Conquest of America (1982), Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (1984), Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps (1991), On Human Diversity (1993), Hope and Memory (2000), and Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism (2002). Todorov's historical interests have focused on such crucial issues as the conquest of The Americas and the Nazi and Stalinist concentration camps.

Held at the RSA in December, Tzvetan Todorov’s discussion of the enlightenment was altogether thought provoking, however it was a minor reference that really caught my attention. Todorov highlighted what he thought to be one fault line left by the enlightenment movement, namely the idea that science can take us anywhere and can teach us everything. A relatively benign concept, it was initially recognized by enlightenment thinkers as both fallible and containing limitations. It has been steadily revolutionized, however, to the point where “scientism” forms what many conceive of as an ideological movement. The basic understanding of scientism is that it is a view that espouses the superiority of science over all other interpretations of life, for example the religious and philosophical. The radicalization is in the overreaching of the discipline into other areas where scientific enquiry may not have jurisdiction, and the sense that there is no other appropriate means of interpreting our reality. Todorov discussed scientism as fuelling the evolution of totalitarianism within Europe through the growing sense of biological understanding. Resultantly, we are capable of accelerating the work of nature and eliminating whatever is perceived as a “lower” form of life. An apt example that could be brought in would be the prominence of scientific experimentation and profiling used under the Nazi regime, or even the elimination of bourgeois or minority groups, a commonly repeated formula in European history. For Todorov the permanent cycle of ‘improvement’ we are seeing from science is dangerous, potentially leading us on a path which could very well end disastrously, either for environmental reasons, or because of the encroaching involvement of science in the creation or reconfiguration of humans. And this is something with which ethicists in particular have been grappling for as long as science has been experimentally intervening with humans; the fear that in offering the ability to, for example, ‘design’ our children we will create a race which eliminates everything that is seen as an ‘unwanted characteristic’

## case

#### Siting decisions based on non-racial factors – best evidence

Kevin 97

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Nondiscriminatory factors account for disparate results in the great majority of formal siting decisions. Some hazardous waste landfill sites which are often cited as examples of environmental racism, such as Emelle, Alabama and Warren County, North Carolina, may be technically superior to alternate sites. n92 For example, when Chemical Waste Management made its decision to site a hazardous waste landfill, Emelle was the only county east of the Mississippi River evaluated by EPA and listed as one of the ten most desirable counties for a landfill. n93 Factors accounting for its desirability as a landfill included the sparse population surrounding the site, reliable access to the site, and arid temperature in the site's location. n94 Most importantly, Emelle was underlain by dense natural chalk forming a good barrier between waste disposal activities and aquifers. n95 Other factors being equal, and independent of racism, siting proponents seek out areas where the costs of siting are low relative to comparable areas. n96 Minority communities are often in areas [\*140] with lower land values. n97 In addition, although the assertion that "no one likes to live near a waste site" n98 is probably correct, in some instances there has not been strong opposition from minority communities that have been or would be affected by a LULU siting. n99 It is reasonable to conclude that lack of opposition has resulted from the same factors that have been cited in the cases of white communities which have solicited LULUs; as well as potential problems, LULUs can bring potential benefits to communities in jobs, revenues and direct provision of social services. n100 In some cases, not only has there been a lack of local opposition to LULU sitings, but community leaders have actively sought out or welcomed such sitings. For example, the Campo Band of Mission Indians has supported the construction of a solid waste landfill on reservation land in San Diego County, California. n101 Permitting and environmental standards for the landfill would meet, at a minimum, applicable EPA standards. n102 The landfill [\*141] would bring great economic benefits to the Campo Band. n103 Tribal sources estimated that the landfill would directly create at least fifty-five permanent jobs for at least thirty-five members of the Campo Band, almost eliminating tribal unemployment. n104 Here, the most sustained and politically effective opposition to siting the landfill has come from several white neighbors of the Campo Reservation. n105 Unfortunately, LULUs have been sited despite considerable opposition from minority communities. Siting in the face of local opposition, however, is not limited to minority communities. A prominent example of LULU siting in spite of objections from non-minority communities is the decision to place a high-level radioactive waste repository in Nevada. n106 Conversely, other communities with white majorities have lobbied to have facilities, which most people would consider to be LULUs, sited in their jurisdictions in order to gain jobs and other benefits during difficult economic times. n107 In both situations, non-racial factors better explain the outcomes than intentional or societal racism.

#### Turns the case – they divert energy from the struggle against residential racism

#### Rooting the problem in siting distracts from segregated housing patterns

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

The vagueness problem notwithstanding, such concrete complaints such as filth, noise, odors, congestion, and dilapidation are legitimately environmental, for they are public and collectively experienced burdens that offend the senses, depress the spirit, and exacerbate other problems.53 Also clearly environmental are such challenges as a paucity of green space, recreational opportunities, and simple fresh air. Lack of access to such environmental amenities constitutes a compelling social equity problem for which effective citizen and community advocacy are not merely useful but essential. These problems, and the skewed residential patterns that may underlie or intensify them, should be addressed directly rather than riding as hidden cargo aboard exaggerated or unsubstantiated assertions of risk and racism in siting and enforcement. It distorts the truth to describe as "racist" locational decisions by business firms that simply amount to rational business practices. Such practices include searching for cheap land, for infrastructure conveniences (that is, access to highways, rail lines, docks, pipelines, and other commercial amenities near which persons of modest means often reside), and for communities unlikely to oppose one's presence.54

#### Best SYNTHESIS of studies disproves environmental racism

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Christopher Boerner and Thomas Lambert have observed that many studies suffer from severe methodological difficulties or are too limited in scope to reliably indicate broader patterns.66 Indeed, once contrary findings and thoughtful criticisms are taken adequately into account, even a reasonably generous reading of the foundational empirical research alleging environmental inequity along racial lines must leave room for profound skepticism regarding the reported results. Taken as a whole this research offers, at best, only tenuous support for the hypothesis of racial inequity in siting or exposure, and no insight into the crucial issues of risk and health impact.

#### Best studies disprove – scale of analysis

Kevin 97

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As one commentator concluded, "notwithstanding the growing significance of the environmental justice movement, few rigorous studies have been conducted that satisfactorily establish a statistically significant correlation between a community's race and socioeconomic status and its exposure to disproportionate environmental risks or impacts." n61 There are sufficiently important methodological problems with some of the more prominent studies that many environmental justice advocates rely upon to warrant caution in accepting claims of disproportionality at face value. A study by Douglas Anderton, et. al (Anderton Study) of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities in the United States that opened for business prior to 1990 and were still open in 1992, and about which data could be found on the level of census [\*134] tracts (about eighty-five percent of such facilities), came to very different conclusions than the UCC and other studies cited by many environmental justice advocates. n62 The Anderton Study found that there were no statistically significant differences between the percentages of Blacks and Hispanics in census tracts with TSDFs and in tracts without such facilities. n63 In other words, there was no correlation between the presence of these minority groups and the presence of a TSDF. n64 The study also found that there were statistically significant correlations between the presence of a TSDF and the following socioeconomic factors: lower employment rate of males, employment in industrial occupations and lower housing values, as compared with non-TSDF tracts. n65 Of these factors, "the most significant and consistent effect on TSDF location of those [factors] ... considered is that TSDFs are located in areas with larger proportions of workers employed in industrial activities, a finding that is consistent with a plausibly rational motivation to locate near other industrial facilities or markets." n66 The discrepancies between the results of the Anderton Study and the findings of the UCC Study stem from the differences in geographic units of analysis chosen by the researchers. n67 The zip code areas used in the UCC Study are larger than the census tracts used in the Anderton Study. The use of these larger units increases the percentage of Blacks in particular. The Anderton Study found that when census tracts within a two and a half mile radius of TSDFs were aggregated, the percentage of black residents was greater than the percentage of Blacks in census tracts containing TSDFs. n68 [\*135] There are no firm guidelines on how to define the geographic extent of areas that are potentially affected, in terms of health, property values and other indicators, by the presence of TSDFs. However, it is likely that data derived from census tracts produce more defensible statistical results than do data based on zip code areas. Accordingly, it is likely that the Anderton Study is more reliable than the UCC Study. n69 Census tracts are designed to be homogeneous with respect to population characteristics, economic status and living conditions. n70 In contrast, zip code areas are basically geographic designations, intended to maximize the transportation efficiency of postal deliveries. n71 Thus, any homogeneity within zip codes is fortuitous, rather than being present by design. Assuming that greater impacts are experienced by individuals closer to a TSDF, census tracts containing a TSDF would logically bear the greatest potential burdens. If there is no correlation between minority populations and TSDFs within census tracts, then the core environmental justice arguments that minorities are targeted for the siting of TSDFs and that minorities disproportionately bear the burdens of such siting are weakened. If a larger percentage of minorities are found within a radius of several miles of TSDFs than is found in the national population, this is arguably due to the larger percentages of minorities in industrial areas in general, which occurs regardless of the presence of TSDFs.

#### ! Lack of data orientation makes environmental justice counterproductive

Foreman 98

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

For environmental justice to contribute measurably to public health in low-income and minority communities, it would almost certainly have to stress an epidemiologic perspective (even in connection with regulatory matters) to a far greater extent than is currently the case. Activism would have to begin with effects and then support honest, analytically defensible assessments of causal factors. But given the overriding concern with citizen mobilization and participation, the continuing focus on citizen fears and frustrations, and the strong incentives for those persons engaged in this activity to continue it, any such shift in perspective would be difficult to achieve.

#### Chicken egg dilemma disproves eco-racism

Glasgow 5

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NOT IN ANYBODY'S BACKYARD? THE NON-DISTRIBUTIVE PROBLEM WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

In a series of articles, Vicki Been set forth a particularly powerful critique of environmental justice studies. n29 Been notes that most studies examined the contemporary makeup of a neighborhood impacted by a LULU, not its makeup at the time of siting. n30 This method ignores the possibility that a LULU would lower nearby housing prices, causing affluent residents to move away. These residents would be replaced by lower-income individuals, attracted by the lower housing prices. As a result of these market dynamics, even LULUs located in a wealthy neighborhood could later become surrounded by the poor. n31 This "chicken-or-the-egg" dilemma has plagued the environmental justice literature. n32

#### This dilemma matters – eco-gentrification

Banzhaf 11

Environmental Justice

A slightly revised version of this article, with no citations, will appear as an entry in the

Elsevier Encyclopedia of Resource, Energy, and Environmental Economics

H. Spencer Banzhaf

Georgia State University

<http://www2.gsu.edu/~prchsb/Elsevier%20Encyc%20Env%20Justice%20%28with%20refs%29.pdf>

If such Tiebout sorting, or coming to the nuisance, is an important factor in explaining the observed correlations, it would have important policy implications. At a minimum, it would imply that many policies designed to reverse environmental justice correlations may inevitably be ineffective, as households can always move in patterns that would recreate the correlation. At most, such policies may make poor households worse off through a process of "environmental gentrification." By the logic of this socioeconomic process, poor households sort into the community because their priority is affordable housing, which allows them to save money for other necessities, so their willingness to pay for the environment is relatively low. In contrast, wealthier gentrifiers bid up housing prices to their own, higher, willingness to pay, harming the poorer incumbents who must now pay higher rents (see e.g. Sieg et al. 2004). Consequently, if the dynamic of Tiebout sorting plays an important role in explaining observed environmental justice correlations, it would appear to push back the locus of injustice from an environmental question to a more general question about the distribution of wealth.

#### Gentrification enforces racial injustice

Wasted Ideology 11

<http://wastedideology.blogspot.com/2011/03/gentrification-is-apartheid-housing.html>

Community Activist in NYC

Gentrification is Apartheid; The Housing Bubble: Class War The base line criticism of gentrification is obvious: upper middle class (there's no such thing as middle class anymore, darling) college graduates move from all across this great nation into NYC, and, in need of cheap rent\* move into once impoverished neighborhoods, now celebrated for their stock of beautiful old rowhouses, convenient access to the subway system and "genuine" "gritty" "New York" feel. In short, predominantly white young people move into a neighborhood, landlords raise rents every May and September (the college year, dummy!), until rent in the area is too expensive for the predominantly black and Latino residents, driving them further from even marginally desirable neighborhoods, uprooting them from their homes and destroying their communities. You can argue that gentrification helps increase economic activity in the neighborhood, brings down crime, and desegregates neighborhoods racially. You'd be wrong, but not only because organic grocery stores replace bodegas and cafes replace barbershops, so that old businesses are pushed out, creating a new local economy rather than helping the existent one; not only because (unofficially, of course) the punitive consequences for violent crime against white people are significantly more severe, so that more white people in a neighborhood means fewer targets for violent crime, which, combined with increased police presence, just moves crime towards less gentrified areas; not only because, despite the visible mix of skin tone on the street, the populations tend to favor totally different hang outs (in my neighborhood there is a hipster bar, Sweet Revenge, literally next door to an old neighborhood stalwart, Franklin Palace: crowds of white twenty somethings divided by twenty inches of plaster from a crowd of black locals).

# 2NC

## 2nc ov

It turns the case—a stasis point is the necessary precondition for examining any issue

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

According to Eugene Matusov, classroom examples of authoritative discourse also include “intolerance, speaking for others, an unwillingness to listen to and genuinely question others, the failure to test one’s own ideas and assumptions, and the desire to impose one’s own views on others” (Matusov, 2007: 231). Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, refers to language use directed towards mutual communication and the mutual construction of knowledge: “In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and halfsomeone- else's” (Bakhtin, 1981: 345). In this way, internally persuasive discourse marks a creative border zone based on the impossibility of any word ever being final, and for this reason it is “able to reveal ever newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981: 346). But internally persuasive discourse cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others, as it requires the ability to be involved in and embody how “diverse voices collide with each other in a dialogue that tests these ideas” (Matusov, 2007: 230). Thus, internally persuasive discourse always requires some form of dialogical and critical exposure that can be supported by the interplay of different voices in a classroom setting. The application of Bakhtin’s terms to classroom contexts can be quite problematic as the two terms easily end up as an unproductive dichotomy between authoritative (“bad”) and persuasive (“good”) discourse. Bakhtin scholar Gary Saul Morson has tried to further elaborate the two concepts and argues that internally persuasive discourse cannot be sustained in a classroom without authority (Morson, 2004).21 Quite simply, it is impossible to create shared classroom attention solely on the basis of internally persuasive discourse.

## at: rob = inclusion

#### The attempt to INCLUDE all stories make environmental justice UNSUSTAINABLY fragile and tanks coalitions

Foreman 98

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Barnstorming and Brainstorming: EPA and Community Involvement Efforts to stimulate ongoing and meaningful public involvement in regulatory policy processes clearly face significant problems, especially when fear and outrage are muted. Sheer nonparticipation, resulting in nonrepresentativeness, is exceedingly difficult to address. "No matter what the circumstances, many who are eligible to participate do not," observes John Clayton Thomas in a recent prescriptive overview of public involvement, "and those who do participate are seldom a cross section of all who are eligible.27 This is especially true where persons of low income and education are concerned; in particular, the correlation between propensity to participate in politics and level of education is well established.28 The EPA has provided considerable advisory access for committed activists but struggles when trying to cast a wider net effectively. Such efforts can often yield indifference, alienation, or torrents of illinformed and unfocused anger. As President Clinton was about to sign executive order 12898 in February 1994, seven agencies, including the EPA and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, sponsored a Symposium on Health Research and Needs to Ensure Environmental Justice at an Arlington, Virginia, hotel.29 According to an EPA official who helped arrange it, one intention of organizers was to reach beyond the regular coterie of "activists who come to everything," bringing in "ordinary folks" from communities around the country. A $300,000 government subsidy helped generate some 1,300 attendees, nearly twice as many as had been expected.3<> But the event is still grimly recalled less for any initiatives it generated than for the harsh questioning and verbal attacks that reduced EPA administrator Browner to tears when she departed from her prepared remarks and conversed with the assembly in a prolonged and unscripted series of ex changes. More generally, large participatory meetings are often unwieldy and prone to theatrics. Evidence suggests that any effect of even orderly public hearings on established federal programs may be small and temporary, if there is any effect at all.3\* Focus is bound to be particularly elusive when representatives of multiple communities attend or set the agenda. In the environmental justice context, such meetings emanate from, and sustain, the belief that all concerns deserve redress—an inclusiveness that appeals both ideologically, because it allows advocates to escape the role of "victimizer," and politically, because it avoids potentially divisive battles over the movement's agenda. As noted earlier, local agendas tend to animate local groups, and it is inherently difficult to build a coalition among such groups except by embracing everyone's parochial concerns. Such groups are often institutionally fragile; they have few resources and notoriously rely on a small core of reliable activists.3= Once the immediate threat that mobilized the group has passed, persons who have contributed vital organizational resources may drift away.

#### Inclusion of non-topical advocacy in environmental justice is debilitating – only LIMITS and FOCUS enable effective prioritization

Foreman 98

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Its relatively congenial and accessible structure belies two basic limitations. One is that, like the environmental justice movement that inspired it, NEJAC is unable to define or focus on a set of policy priorities smaller than the full universe of federal, state, and local environmental justice issues. Painstakingly participatory in orientation, hopping among issues as they arise and ideas as they are generated, the council is a mechanism appropriate to conveying, and perhaps amplifying, demands, but not for deciding which ones deserve priority or how they should be compromised on behalf of other goals. like the October 1991 First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, which yielded its seventeen principles of environmental justice through political and highly ideological accumulation rather than discriminating analysis, NEJAC is not the place to look for hard thinking about the boundaries of, or potential tradeoffs embedded in, environmental justice. The prevailing council view appears to be that all communities and all voices within them are more or less equally legitimate and deserving. Accordingly, their main concern is to enhance the overall "community presence" whenever and wherever possible. That, for example, is why the council successfully prodded the EPA to allow the creation of an indigenous peoples subcommittee in 1995; several NEJAC members had long been concerned that "issues important to indigenous peoples had not been addressed adequately by the existing committee structure of NEJAC."39 The council listens sympathetically to public comments and encourages the EPA or other agencies to take action. Its focus, especially within its subcommittees, is less on health or risk than on ferreting out and elevating community perspectives. But NEJAC eschews anything like a formal comparative assessment among the claims brought before it and there is no pressure from the EPA, or from anywhere else for that matter, for it to behave otherwise. Not surprisingly, NEJACs determination to achieve maximum inclusiveness can be procedurally debilitating at times. For example, in December 1996, at NEJACs eighth meeting in Baltimore, the public comment calendar was overcrowded, as is often the case; more than thirty individuals were signed up to speak. Chairman Moore, as usual, gently and repeatedly reminded both council members and the public of the "need to move along" to get through the list. But then a pair of Native American activists offered a rambling joint presentation that ended by calling for NEJAC to help free imprisoned activist Leonard Peltier, whom many observers have long believed to have been unjustly convicted for the murder of two FBI agents. The flow of public comment immediately halted as various council members (including chairman Moore) offered damning opinions regarding Peltier's incarceration. As the council began discussing what action it might appropriately take, no one dared venture what might appear obvious: that whatever the merits of Peltier's case, an EPA advisory council was simply an inappropriate forum in which to address that issue.

#### Environment justice must be approached through CONCRETE POLICY analysis that WEIGHS disadvantages– only SWITCH SIDE works

Foreman 98

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More frequent resort to a rationalizing, if not solely economic, perspective would encourage minority and low-income citizens and community leaders to think more carefully about priority-setting and myriad tradeoffs. Might widespread successes of NIMBY (not in my back yard) initiatives keep older and dirtier pollution sources active longer and thus adversely affect minority and low-income persons living adjacent to those sources? By the same token, does local insistence on full treatment at some Superfund sites (that is, the obsession with Breyer's "last ten percent") mean that risks elsewhere that might have been addressed under a more limited or flexible regime will not get attended to at all? Such questions cannot be answered here, but the disinclination even to pose them is troubling. That a "nobody should suffer" position advocating maximum citizen engagement could have perverse effects will be painful for many even to consider. But honestly confronting the reality that no environmental amenity (with the possible exception of planetary gravity) is equally distributed may help make citizens more likely to ask hard questions about which inequities matter most. A more careful and comprehensive set of environmental equity comparisons than has been produced to date would probably conclude that there is reason for cheer on some fronts. After all, many Native Americans residing on tribal land, along with rural blacks, doubtless breathe far cleaner air than many far wealthier city dwellers. Of course, once broader social equity concerns—the real motivation for much environmental justice advocacy—are factored in, any clean air advantage may appear insignificant. If Albert Nichols is right that failure to set environmental priorities based on risk has only worsened the inequities faced by minority and low-income communities, then there is even more compelling reason for greater reliance on a rationalizing approach. Writes Nichols in a direct critique of Bullard: If we accept the argument that the existing (politicized] approach has paid insufficient attention to the health and environmental risks faced by minority communities, what does that then say about a risk-based alternative? A strategy that emphasized attacking the largest and most easily reduced risks first would appear to represent a major gain for minority communities. To the extent that such communities bear unusually high risks as a result of past discrimination or other factors, a risk-based approach would redirect more resources to these communities. Indeed, a risk-based approach would give highest priority to attacking precisely the kinds of problems that most concern Bullard.23 If conventional environmental justice advocacy cannot confront risk magnitudes honestly, it cannot help much in the assessment and management of tradeoffs, either of the risk/risk or risk/benefit varieties. The notion that attacking some risks may create others is largely foreign to environmental justice—beyond a fear that attacking the risk of poverty with industrial jobs may expose workers to hazardous conditions. A focus on community inclusion, although necessary to the ultimate acceptability of decisions, offers no automatic or painless way to sort through tradeoffs.24 When confronted with choices posing both risks and benefits— such as a proposed hazardous waste treatment facility that would create jobs, and impose relatively low risks, in a needy area—environmental justice offers, along with disgust that such horrendous choices exist, mainly community engagement and participation. But because such situations tend to stimulate multiple (and often harshly raised) local voices on both sides of the issue, activists are at pains to decide where (besides additional participation and deliberation) the community's interest lies. Because an activist group will be in close touch with both the fear of toxics and the hunger for economic opportunity, the organization itself may be torn. The locally one-sided issue presents far preferable terrain for activists. It should surprise no one that activists are anxious to deemphasize community-level disagreement of this sort. Nor is it surprising to learn from the head of a prominent environmental justice organization that her group tries to avoid situations that pose precisely these locally polarizing tradeoffs.25 Faced with such tensions, environmental justice partisans may simply retreat into cant, attacking a system that facilitates "environmental blackmail," allowing disadvantaged communities to become "hooked on toxics."26

## at: personal experience good

#### Personal experience at the expense of dialogue shuts down deliberation and makes debate useless

SUBOTNIK 98

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, **the central** CRT **message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly**, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - **but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly**.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, **it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly** n75 **- destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from** abstracting themselves **from their pain in order** to gain perspective **on their condition**. n77

 [\*696] **Last, as we have seen,** it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If **through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, **has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences** which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, **the kinds of issues** raised by Williams **are too important** in their implications  [\*698]  for American life **to be confined to communities of color.** If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, **it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse** to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

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Only switching sides produces an energy dialogue that activates critique

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(Ruth, “Discourse, power, and energy conflicts: understanding Welsh renewable energy planning policy,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 27, p. 512-526)

It could be argued that this result arose from the lack of expertise of the convenors of the TAN 8 in consensual decision making. Indeed, there is now more research and advice on popular participation in policy issues at a community level (eg Kaner et al, 1996; Ostrom, 1995; Paddison, 1999). However, for policy making the state remains the vehicle through which policy goals must be achieved (Rydin, 2003) and it is through the state that global issues such as climate change and sustainable development must be legislated for, and to some extent enacted. It is therefore through this structure that any consensual decision making must be tested. This research indicates that the policy process cannot actually overcome contradictions and conflict. Instead, **encompassing them may well be a more fruitful way forward than attempts at consensus.** Foucault reinforces the notion that the `field of power' can prove to be positive both for individuals and for the state by allowing both to act (Darier, 1996; Foucault, 1979). Rydin (2003) suggests that actors can be involved in policy making but through `deliberative' policy making rather than aiming for consensus: ``the key to success here is not consensus but building a position based on divergent positions'' (page 69).

Deliberative policy making for Rydin involves: particular dialogic mechanisms such as speakers being explicit about their values, understandings, and activities: the need to move back and forth between memories (historical) and aspirations (future); moving between general and the particular; and the adoption of role taking (sometimes someone else's role). There is much to be trialed and tested in these deliberative models, however, a strong state is still required as part of the equation if we are to work in the interests of global equity, at least until the messages about climate change and sustainable development are strong enough to filter through to the local level. It is at the policy level that the usefulness of these various new techniques of deliberative policy making must be tested, and at the heart of this must be an understanding of the power rationalities at work in the process.

## 2nc at: state/roleplaying bad

Decisionmaking skills learned from debate over technical energy issues are key to actualizing political change

Hodson, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, ‘10

(Derek, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.

FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION

Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy.**

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

 Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

## 2nc at: case specific exclusion/ethics

Topical version of the aff solves—incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in **decision making** diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of **grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states.** In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the **legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions** which produced those projects.

Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.

In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The **technicality** **of the issue** **was not a barrier** to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the **goals of energy policy could be recast** and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.

First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest **undermined** the **legitimacy** of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

## enviro justice—t good

Dialogic engagement over pragmatic policy proposals creates linkages and strategies capable of combatting environmental racism and injustice

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(Mei-Fang, “Democracy and Environmental Justice: The Case of Nuclear Waste Disposal in Taiwan,” Paper for the Political Studies Association 54th Annual Conference, Section 8-5: Democratisation and Sustainability 2, 6-8 April)

Habermas’s ideal of consensus is seen as outmoded (Lyotard, 1984: 66), unattainable and undesirable as people can have different reasons for agreement on a particular action (Dryzek, 2000: 170). Habermas recognizes this problem and his later work Between Facts and Norms attempts to **be more open to difference**, which includes ‘pragmatic discourse about what should be done in terms of translating consensus into binding decision capable of implementation, and negotiations concerning what to do when values and interests irreducibly conflict’ (Dryzek, 2000: 24-5). Intercultural dialogue does not need to seek unanimous agreement. As Antonio (1989: 743) puts it, ‘pragmatist social interaction depends on the capacity to share attitudes and does not rely on value consensus; sympathetic understanding of the other does not require agreement or homogeneity.’ Following the conception of pragmatism, intercultural dialogue over environmental justice allows arriving at agreement on goals or actions without necessarily reaching a shared set of reasons for these goals or actions or value positions. Hutchison (2003: 34-6) argues that borders based on territorial, cultural, ethnic or religious categories as a production of socialization restrict the participation of ‘outsiders’ in discourse on issues that are of concern to them. Group interaction or intercultural dialogue is **undermined by dominant modes of thought**, by history and by context. For dealing with difference of values, she argues, pragmatism provides an alternative framework that ‘prompts flexibility and acceptance when thinking of those “outside” our borders’ (p.36). According to Rorty (1999: 48), ‘all our knowledge is under descriptions suited to our current social purposes’, which best copes with our situation. A pragmatic approach to intercultural dialogue suggests we seek ‘to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can’ and strive for ‘as much intersubjective agreement as possible because we realize that ‘no interpretation of reality is innately superior (Rorty, 1991: 23; Hutchison, 2003: 36). Relying on research conducted by social psychologists which shows that that ‘the boundaries of the moral community within which people are willing to apply principles of justice to fellow members are affected by perceptions of similarity and common identity’, Miller (2002: 219) provides critique of radical differences between groups within the community because ‘people who identify exclusively with their ethnic sub-groups as opposed to embracing a more inclusive identity alongside it are less willing to accept the authority of procedures that may be used to resolve disputes or allocate resources, and become more concerned about well or how badly they have fared personally in the outcome.’ He suggests participants in the dialogue need to be more justice-driven: You must **strike a fine balance** between emphasizing what you have in common with other members of your audience, so as to win their sympathy and motivate them to see you as someone to whom justice is owned, and **emphasizing the ways in which you are different**, and which mean that you have special needs or suffer special disadvantages. (Miller, 2002: 221). I think Miller had it right that the dialectics between commonality and difference is important for the process of intercultural dialogue. Notions of environmental justice should be understood in a more pluralist and pragmatic fashion in a multicultural society that is more open to others with difference, and does not demand unanimous agreement in the dialogic process as a basis for collective decision. Intercultural dialogue helps people realize a variety of different ways of thinking about environmental justice, but the validity of ideas should be tested through their efficacy in practice (Rescher, 1993: 192-3). Siegfriend (1996: 275) makes a similar argument from a pragmatic feminist perspective that this method ‘does not mean avoiding conflicts or denying differences.’ A pragmatic approach to intercultural dialogue can **best cope with the complex situation**, and the norms or values arrived at through intercultural dialogic procedure would enhance interactions and the recognition of group differences. Fvanoff (2002: 57) argues that our socially constructed ideas and values can be challenged and reformulated in ways that are more adaptive to changing situations. Constructivism sees norms and principles as being actively ‘produced’ through the process of dialogue in which the participants are open to the differing perspective of others, acknowledge the limitations of their own particular perspectives, and change their initial positions as they learn from each other. Following Evanoff (2002), I argue that the differing idea of environmental justice held by the Yami, the Taiwanese and other Taiwanese aboriginal environmental communities are not inevitable or absolute. New values and norms can be created through the interactions and dialogue among a variety of environmental communities that enables us to best stand in nuclear waste dilemmas. According to MacIntyre (1988), no existing tradition implies a university conception of justice and the coming together of communities with various traditions might open up new alternative possibilities and enlarge our views of justice. He outlines three stages of the process of developing a wider perspective and new concepts: A first in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities have not yet been put in question; a second in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not yet remedied; and a third in which response to those inadequacies has resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations (1998, 355). Dialogue between the Yami, the Taiwanese and other aboriginal environmental communities with various traditions can facilitate reflection on the various positions and the transformation of those beliefs or concepts unable to deal with the conflicts between them and nuclear waste dilemmas. The multiple understanding of environmental justice and **competing views** on nuclear waste management held by the Yami and Taiwanese groups **can be critically tested**, and a variety of environmental communities need to reflect on the questions of what should be done. Following Mendus’s (1989) discussions of Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism, Philip (1993: 157, 161) argues for ‘more dynamic sense of differences as changing.’ She rightly suggests that difference ‘challenges dominant groups to reassess their own values and perspective, but also challenges subordinate and excluded groups to go beyond sectarian loyalties.’ **This does not mean that difference can be denied**, but seeks for ‘a wider sense of belonging.’ The idea held by the Yami and Taiwanese environmental communities might on the surface appear incommensurable, but different principles might be integrated into a larger framework that are widely accepted in a given social context and appropriate to address nuclear waste dilemmas. Intercultural dialogue among a variety of environmental communities helps enhance a sense of recognition, build bridges between the Yami, the Taiwanese and other Taiwanese aborigines, and remove the barriers to establishing alliance between them.

Policy and scientific knowledge, combined with state engagement, key to environmental justice activism—university spaces are key

Grineski, associate professor of sociology – University of Texas El Paso, ‘6

(Sara E., “Local Struggles for Environmental Justice: Activating Knowledge for Change,” *Journal of Poverty*, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 25-49)

Environmental knowledge and how it is acquired and deployed are important features of local environmental politics in the US. “Communitybased participatory research” denotes research projects that involve cooperation between academic and non-academic researchers in creating knowledge intended to inform change (Israel, 2000). Within movements for environmental justice (EJ), community-based participatory research (CBPR) is a powerful tool for influencing change because, as one environmental justice activist explained, “Effective collaborations move us all toward a healthier and safer community using strategies arrived at through consensus of informed experts, community leaders and residents” (Shepard, 2000, p. 38). While Israel (2000, p. 21) recognizes the role of the university in CBPR as being unequivocally committed to research that benefits the community “either through direct intervention or by using the results to inform action for change,” this paper explores an additional role for the university, that of catalysis. In this paper, I use catalysis as a metaphor for a role the university can plan in movements for EJ. A catalyst is an agent (usually an enzyme) added to a chemical reaction to increase its speed by, for example, allowing it to occur at a lower temperature. Social capital can accrue to politically marginalized communities through the **direct participation of scientists** in their environmental struggles. In addition to examining the role of the university, I explore how neighborhood struggles for EJ can result in change through the **activation of knowledge** in certain political-legal frames. The interpenetration of lay knowledge and expert knowledge during CBPR can spur environmental justice action when enabled by political-legal structures and subvert the supposed binary between science and advocacy. I also discuss how local actions for socio-environmental change can be limited by uncertainties in knowledge and inadequate political-legal frameworks

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, even in the presence of apparent environmental injustices and best CBPR practices. As the federal government hastens toward market-based environmental regulations attuned to corporate incentives and voluntarism, and environmental laws continue to be weakened, it becomes increasingly difficult for groups to challenge environmental injustices (Girder &Smith, 2002). Thus, **pressuring the State** for new environmental laws and rigorous enforcement of existing laws remain important strategies for EJ groups (Pellow, 2001a). I use an ethnographic approach to examine these issues, studying a CBPR effort in a poor, Latino neighborhood called Homedale in Phoenix, Arizona (see Figure 1) involving Arizona State University researchers, two professional community activists, and local residents. Homedale is a neighborhood built post-WWII and bordered by, among other things, a power plant, recycling plant, rendering plant, junkyards, warehouses, and a busy interstate truck stop. Minority and low-income urban neighborhoods have historically suffered environmental injustices in the form of unequal distribution of hazards in the United States (Brown, 1995; Szasz&Meuser, 1997). Environmental justice can be defined as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies” (Bullard&Johnson, 2000, p. 558). In Phoenix, research has indicated that low-income and minority neighborhoods bear unequal environmental burdens (Bolin et al., 2000, 2004). An increase in number of industrial facilities, and a growing awareness that the siting of these facilities in low-income minority neighborhoods is sometimes intentional has spawned numerous community-based EJ movements, for example, those in Chester, Pennsylvania (Cole & Foster, 2001), Love Canal, New York (Levine, 1982), Woburn, Massachusetts (Brown, 1987), and Phoenix, Arizona (e.g., Pijawka et al., 1998; Sicotte, 2003). Grass roots activism often produces personal and political empowerment among its members. This was well documented in the Love Canal case1. Love Canal was especially important historically, as it revealed the limits of federal waste policies enacted in the late 1970s and pioneered new forms of environmental leadership, in which women, the poor, and people of color dealt with scientific issues of toxicity and health in order to challenge large hazardous industries (Gottlieb, 1993). An “environment justice frame” includes demand for social justice, respect for grassroots knowledge, expectation of just compensation for harms, and close links to civil rights principles (Capek, 1993). Within the academy, social scientists and public health researchers usually conduct EJ research. Science within the EJ frame is thus a situated science; normative claims about social justice and fairness infiltrate research agendas. Due to their involvement and research products, it has been argued that academics have been **more central to the environmental justice movement** than they have been to any other social movement in the US (see Cole & Foster, 2000, pp. 20-26 for complete discussion). Knowledge developed about the environment, including that which emerges in EJ struggles is usually classified in terms of whether it is “lay” or “expert.” Lay knowledge is a locality-based way of knowing characterized as meanings or understandings people attach to a place that shape social actions and help them understand the world (Popay et al., 1998). It is: Stabilized and fixed through an articulation of place and identity. Because one is from a place, one has certain knowledge and speaks from that place. “Expert” knowledge on the other hand, appears to transcend these historical-geographic boundaries and looms as applicable anytime and anywhere by those who have gone through the process to transcend their own locality (i.e., become experts). (Fraser & Lepofsky, 2004, p. 7)

# 1AR

## at: energy can be anything

#### THAT’S THE LINK – it’s the freefloating CIRCULATION of scientific energy metaphors that upholds SCIENTISM

Clarke 1

Energy Forms:

Allegory and Science in the Era of Classical Thermodynamics

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Technoscientism, then, is a monumental allegory of modern science produced by the transdisciplinary circulation of scientific metaphors and, in field theories in particular, by the formal extension of models of energy. The very movement of concepts from site to site within the cultural field tends to curve signs into polysemous figurations, multileveled allegories. Even within a single disciplinary site, the use of heuristic figures can bring about some productive increment of discursive excess. Hayles discusses this phenomenon with regard to the heuristic career of Maxwell's Demon: "the detour through language which the heuristic represents"—in this instance, the placing of the overdetermined term demon into this physical context—"creates polysemous connections not present in the theory itself."16 The kinetic theory of gases and the second law of thermodynamics, mundane phenomena of heat flow, become literally daemonic—that is, creative of new discursive mediations—because "overlaying a heuristic onto a theory is never merely an inert transposition of concepts ... it generates a surplus of signification" (33). Haylcs nicely states here what I take to be the abstract rhetorical basis of technoscientism. The scientistic allegorization of science arises from the excess of epistemic signification inherent in any social semanticizing of scientific or mathematical ideas. Generated within given disciplines, the excess signification of heuristic theorizations elicits speculative extensions, in William Paulson's trenchant phrase, a productive cultural noise—in various critical and creative forms—within the channels of technoscientific communication. Scientism is a dynamic and unpredictable irruption within the noise of technoscience, giving rise sometimes to dubious social or political doctrines, sometimes to striking productions of artistic and critical selforganization, sometimes to reorganizations of the entire cultural field. Sctientism is the prolific and systematically inevitable supplement of technoscientific action.

## metaphors – impact

#### Turns the case – scientism is a guise for racist colonialism by ideological purists

Streski 95

 University of California, Santa Barbara eui9ias@mvs.oac.ucla.edu Postmodern Culture v.5 n.3 (May, 1995) pmc@jefferson.village.virginia.edu

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<http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.595/review-7.595>

Todorov argues further that universalism is not the only villain in perpetuating colonialism. Any available justification will serve colonialist ambitions: if not universalism, then %Lebensraum%. Besides, Todorov argues, ideologies such as (ethnocentric) universalism seldom, if ever, "motivate" colonial enterprises; they merely serve as post-facto "self-legitimations." Indeed, for Todorov, universalism isn't even the primary legitimating mechanism for colonial violence--scientism is. "Scientism," he says, is the most "perverse" and the most effective ideological weapon in the armory of ethnocentrism and racism, because it so easily passes undetected. People are rarely "proud of being ethnocentric," whereas they often "take pride in professing a 'scientific' philosophy." Here, Diderot becomes a major exemplar of "scientific ethnocentrism," as do Renan, who makes a religion of science, and Gobineau, with his fully elaborated scientific racialism. Todorov's discussion of this aliance between the scientific and the colonial is on the whole fully persuasive. Certainly science has served the needs of modern racialism all too efficiently; both Hitler and Stalin, we must recall, boasted that their ideologies were strictly scientific.

## metaphors – t links

#### The use of energy as a metaphor is IMPOSSIBLE to define or tie down, which makes their scholarship both useless and undebatable

Holt 89

Freud Reappraised:

A Fresh Look At Psychoanalytic Theory

Professor of Psychology Emeritus, New York University.

Another favorite, but dangerous, form of argument on which vitalists rely is analogy. As Schneirla (1949) notes, "A common feature of Vitalism . . . and other procedures featuring the use of analogy is that the organization of processes underlying behavioral systems is not subjected to very close study" (p. 250). This becomes part of a larger point that, with a few notable exceptions like Driesch in his early years, vitalists have not been led by their theory into fruitful experimentation or new types of observation; their methods of seeking truth have been sterile. Hempel and Oppenheim (quoted by Nagel, 1953) make a similar point even more forcefully: All statements about entelechy are inaccessible to empirical test, because there is no provision for any means of testing Another favorite, but dangerous, form of argument on which vitalists rely is analogy. As Schneirla (1949) notes, "A common feature of Vitalism . . . and other procedures featuring the use of analogy is that the organization of processes underlying behavioral systems is not subjected to very close study" (p. 250). This becomes part of a larger point that, with a few notable exceptions like Driesch in his early years, vitalists have not been led by their theory into fruitful experimentation or new types of observation; their methods of seeking truth have been sterile. Hempel and Oppenheim (quoted by Nagel, 1953) make a similar point even more forcefully: All statements about entelechy are inaccessible to empirical test, because there is no provision for any means of testing assertions about it. For similar reasons, Frank (1955, p. 434) called the concept of vital energy "useless" since "we have no 'practical' operation to define the energy of life." This is a serious charge, even if one adopts the generally permissive and moderate versions of operationism that philosophers of science advocate today (e.g., Kaplan, 1964, pp. 36 ff.). Not all terms—particularly theoretical terms, which get their meaning from the network of propositions in which they are embedded—need to have operational definitions; but ultimately, "it must be possible to deduce determinate consequences from the assumptions of the theory," and "at least some theoretical notions must be tied down to fairly definite and unambiguously specified observable materials" (Polanyi, 1962, p. 40). But not only does the dualism of vitalism doom its central concept to unmeasurability, "it has no explanatory import, because it does not function in a set of general laws" (Hempel 6c Oppenheim, quoted by Nagel, 1960). And how is it with psychic energy—is it vulnerable to the same charges? They have surely been leveled against it. In the New York University symposium on psychoanalysis and philosophy of science, Nagel (1960, p. 41) said that he had no objection to metaphor as such, but "in Freudian theorv metaphors are employed without even half-way definite rules for expanding them, and that in consequence admitted metaphors such as 'energy\* or 'level of excitation\* have no specific content and can be filled in to suit one's fancy." A dozen years earlier, Kubie (1947) had attacked psychic energy as an immeasurable, metaphorical concept. Moreover, the theory lacks the tightness of structure that would give its theoretical terms what Kaplan (1964) calls "systemic meaning," for it is "formulated in such a manner that it can always be construed and manipulated so as to explain whatever the actual facts are" (Nagel, 1960, p. 40). Psychic energy has been criticized by Kardiner, Karush, and Ovescy (1959) and by Rubinstein (1967a) as tautologous: The only data by means of which it can be assessed are the very ones it is invoked to explain.

#### The idea of mental or psychic energy is an UNPREDICTABLE sliding signifier and makes no sense

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Despite this historical justification, it is a valid criticism of the psychoanalytic energy concept that it fluctuates, depending on the context—at one point being a survival of Freud's original concept of a physical cathectic quantity traversing the fibers of a somatic nervous system, and then being a purely psychological, non-physico-chemical concept. In this inconsistency, it reflects Freud's inability to reach a satisfactory position in relation to the mind-body problem. For the most part, as Rubinstein (1965) has shown, he assumed that physical energy could somehow be converted into psychic energy, and vice versa—the interactionist solution, which today has relatively few adherents. [See, however, Popper and Eccles (1977).] Interactionism is the prevailing conception of the common-sense psychology that talks about will power as "mind over matter." It assumes causal chains such as this: A physical event (e.g., a pattern of light) causes another physical event (a neural current from retina to brain), which then causes a psychological event (visual perception); this in turn causes a further psychological event (an intention to act), which causes a physical event (movement of the body). Sounds reasonable enough, doesn't it? Reflect, however, that if one were to follow this chain of events on the purely physical/physiological level, there would have to be puzzling and inexplicable lacunae. At the point where the ontological gap was jumped, and physical energy was transformed into psychic energy as Freud assumed (1895b, p. 108), there would be a deficit, and at the corresponding point when the psychic was transformed into the physical there would be a surplus. Presumably these two would cancel one another out, and thus might be hard to detect, though not when there is extensive "delay of discharge." But the fact is that no hint of any such gap in the application of the first law of thermodynamics has ever appeared, no matter how the precision of measurement has been refined; the physical causal sequences flow without a ripple and with complete conservation of physical energy.11 If you ask why psychoanalysts are not troubled by this glaring incompatibility with facts of their theory's dual is tic stand on the mind-body problem, I can only answer that so far as I know, they are almost all of them totally unaware of it. Yet it is a necessary consequence of the doctrine of psychic energy.

#### The impact is statements that can’t be REFUTED or DISPROVED

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A Fresh Look At Psychoanalytic Theory

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Some of the most scientifically sophisticated among psychoanalysts are not satisfied with the argument to this point. They are perfectly willing to abandon the mystical implications—argument by analogy, reification, and anthropomorphism—that have characterized the treatment of psychic energy in much of the psychoanalytic literature and which are so reminiscent of vitalism. All of that may have been true in the past, they argue, but none of it is a necessary aspect of psychic energy, and we have given it up long ago. What is wrong with psychic energy interpreted nondirectionally and nonexistentially as an abstract, quantitative construct with qualities and direction contributed by structures? True, it is not directly measurable, but not every concept needs to be operational in any simple sense, and even in physics energy is only indirectly measurable. Such is the concept of psychic energy as used by Rapaport (1951a, 1959) and by his students (e.g., Schwartz & Rouse, 1961). In this version, the concept is, of course, more nearly acceptable. But let us consider first the issue of measurability. The only directly measurable concepts in physics are the basic dimensions of time, space and mass. A great many other concepts may be quite precisely and determinately measured by means of these three, however, because of the network of laws that define concepts and relationships among them. As Hapaport (1959) himself pointed out, psychology lacks dimensional quantification; psychological measurement is possible, but there is as yet no known way of tightly and systematically relating the resulting quantities to one another or to higherorder constructs. As a result, there is no true analogy in the situations of the two sciences; the indirectness of measurement in physics has never raised the suspicion that energy is a tautologous concept. In psychoanalysis and psychology, however, the burden of proof is on anyone who defends psychic energy to show that it can be measured in a useful way, so that it is estimated independently of the very phenomena it is to explain. And then it is not so easy to escape the necessity of accepting a rather extreme metaphysical position in order to retain psychic energy. To be both consistent and comprehensive, one must adopt interactionism and postulate a break in the chain of physical causality, which will expose one to the constant temptation to avoid any theoretical embarrassment by escaping into the second world of metaphysical mentalism This will make it increasingly difficult for the theory to be tested in any definitive way. Psychoanalysis is already much too invulnerable to the refutation of its theoretical statements—a purely illusory safety, since philosophers of science agree that the usefulness of a theory is a function of its capacity to generate testable consequences, which means to stick its neck out and suffer the possibility of becoming cxtinct. A better theory usually arises from the ashes of the one that expires, however. What is needed in place of psychic energy is not simply a better concept, but a new set of basic assumptions about the nature of the behaving organism and how it operates. In psychoanalysis, such propositions are contained for the most part in metapsychology, on a level of theory that is considerably removed from clinical observation. What Rapaport (1959) called the clinical theory is the distillation of actual w ork with patients; it is known to and Is used daily by every analyst and by most clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychiatric social workers as well. This was Freud's most original and lasting contribution, and for the most part it will stand unaffected by changes in the genera] theory. As Freud recognized, "basic concepts . . . are not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it" (1914c, p. 77).